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In Laidlaw Corp. v. Pulp Workers, Local 681,1 the National
Labor Relations Board held that economic strikers2 who uncon-
ditionally apply for reinstatement at a time when their positions
are filled by permanent replacements:
(1) remain employees; and
(2) are entitled to full reinstatement upon the departure of
replacements unless they have in the meantime ac-
quired regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment; or the employer can sustain his burden of proof
that the failure to offer full reinstatement was for le-
gitimate and substantial business reasons.
Laidlaw overrules a line of cases interpreting the permanently
economic striker's right to reemployment. It gives the permanently
replaced economic striker a preferential right of reemployment af-
ter the strike has ended as vacancies arise and is a far reaching
step in a newly developing trend in the interpretation of an em-
ployee's right to strike. This Comment will review and analyze
the prior case development of the issue presented in Laidlaw to il-
lustrate the impact which that decision will have upon labor-man-
agement relations.
HISTORY OF PREFERENTIAL HIRING RIGHTS
The first case of significance in this field is NLRB v. MacKay
Radio and Telephone Co.3 After an economic strike was called by
the union, the company brought employees from its offices in other
cities to take the place of the strikers. Subsequently, all but five
of those who had been on strike were taken back into the company's
employ. The union brought suit on behalf of these five strikers.
The National Labor Relations Board ordered the company to rein-
state the strikers.4 The Board based its ruling on section 2(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act which defines an employee as
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
1. 171 N.L.R.B. 175 (1968).
2. Economic strikers are employees who engage in a strike over
wages, hours, working conditions or other conditions of employment. NLRB
v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1966).
3. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
4. 1 N.L.R.B. 201 (1936).
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or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtanied any other regular
and substantially equivalent employment. . .. "I'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the enforce-
ment order of the Board because, by requiring reinstatement of
an employee, the Board was forcing an employer to make a new
contract which was beyond the scope of the National Labor Re-
lations Act.6 The Supreme Court held that an employer can re-
place its striking employees with permanent replacements and that
the employer did not have to discharge the permanent replace-
ments after the strike ended. Citing section 2(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act the Court said that even when a strike is
economic in nature, the striker retains his status as an employee.
Consequently, the Court gave the employer the right to hire per-
manent replacements during a strike and confirmed that an eco-
nomic striker has the status of an employee under the National
Labor Relations Act.
1
In American Flint Glass Workers Union v. NLRB,8 the em-
ployer hired permanent replacements during an economic strike
after which the strikers applied for reemployment. Those strikers
not rehired brought suit against the company alleging an unfair
labor practice. In reversing the trial examiner's decision, the
N.L.R.B. held that there was no discriminatory motivation on the
part of the employer.9 By way of dictum the Board said that
permanently replaced economic strikers merely have the right not to
be penalized for their concerted activity and are not entitled to a
preferential status in hiring. Again in dictum, the Board said that
replaced economic strikers are in the position of applicants for new
employment and must sustain the burden of proving discriminatory
motivation by the employer. Section 2 (3) of the Act and the Mac-
Kay case were not discussed in the Board's opinion. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
Board's decision.10
In Atlas Storage Division v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters" an em-
5. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935).
6. 92 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1937) (dissenting opinion). There was
another decision before the above rehearing that held that the National
Labor Relations Act as violative of the fifth amendment. 87 F.2d 611, 632
(9th Cir. 1937) (dissenting opinion).
7. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
8. 110 N.L.R.B. 395, enforcing 230 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
9. 110 N.L.R.B. 395 (1954).
10. 230 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
11. 112 N.L.R.B. 1175, enforcing sub. noam, Teamsters, Local 200 v.
NLRB, 233 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1956).
ployee struck with the permission of the union over the employer's
refusal to bargain with the union. Subsequently, the employee
applied for reinstatement; the employer refused to take him on the
ground that it had sufficient personnel to handle its operations.
Three days after the striker's reinstatement application was made
his job became vacant. The employer did not notify the striker
of the opening and hired a new applicant. The N.L.R.B. disagreed
with the trial examiner 12 and found that the striker was an eco-
nomic striker. He was not entitled to reinstatement because his
job was either abolished or absorbed by other employees for eco-
nomic reasons.'" In affirming the Board's decision the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the employer's duty
toward a replaced economic striker did not include seeking him out
when a vacancy occurred; the employer was only to refrain from
discriminating against him in the event that he made a request to
fill a vacancy." Section 2 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act
was not referred to by the Board or seventh circuit as authority
for their decisions. In effect, the N.L.R.B. now considered absorb-
tion or abolition of a job equivalent to replacement and that either
ended the economic striker's employee status.
The next step in defining the replaced striker's rights was
NLRB v. Brown and Root, Inc.'5 The union alleged that vacancies
occurred after applications were made by economic strikers. It
contended that these vacancies should have been assigned to
strikers as they arose. Finding that there were no vacancies on
the date applications were made, the trial examiner rejected the
union's assumption that the employer had a duty to seek out eco-
nomic strikers as positions became available. The Board affirmed
this holding and found that it was the normal practice of the com-
pany to hire the first available person.16 The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit enforced the Board's decision. 17 The Board cited
Atlas Storage Division as authority for its decision. Section 2(3)
of the Act and MacKay were not referred to in the Board or circuit
court decision.
At this time, the law as interpreted by the National Labor
Relations Board and the various circuit courts was that an em-
ployer could permanently replace economic strikers during a strike
and that an economic striker's right to full reinstatement was to
be determined on the day he reapplied for his job. If a per-
manent replacement occupied his position, or if his job was ab-
sorbed or abolished on the day he reapplied, the economic striker
12. The trial examiner found that he was an unfair labor practice
striker and as such could not be permanently replaced.
13. 112 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1955).
14. 233 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1956).
15. 132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961), enforcing 311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963).
16. 132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961).
17. 311 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1963).
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lost his status as an employee and his rights to full reinstatement.
The employer's only duty towards the economic striker was to re-
frain from discriminatory action against him on his reapplication;
and the burden of proof on the issue of discrimination was on the
economic striker.
This mass of law favoring the employer began crumbling with
the decision of NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.'s During an economic
strike the employer hired permanent replacements and advised the
union that it would accord the replacements some form of super-
seniority. A plan calling for 20 years additional seniority for em-
ployees (including strikers) who work during the strike was de-
vised.'9 A short time later the union decided it had to settle the
strike and submitted the super-seniority issue to the N.L.R.B. The
Board disagreed with the trial examiner2 0 and found the employer
guilty of an unfair labor practice. 21 The Board reasoned that Mac-
Kay permitted an employer to hire permanent replacements during
an economic strike; but it also permitted economic strikers who
were not replaced to return to their jobs with full reinstatement.
It held that this super-seniority plan punished the strikers.22 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied enforcement of the
Board's order.2 3 The court recognized that a preferential seniority
policy may be discriminatory but it held that the discriminatory
conduct of an employer is not unlawful in the absence of an illegal
motive.24 Contrary to the N.L.R.B.'s interpretation of MacKay, the
court reasoned that the "MacKay permanent replacement rule" was
obviously discriminatory and may tend to discourage union mem-
bership and that the Supreme Court in permitting the permanent
replacement rule was applying the true purpose or real motive test
18. 373 U.S. 221 (1961).
19. By June 14, 81 replacements had accepted employment, plus 23
returning strikers. On June 15, Erie Resistor Corporation posted on the
company bulletin board its 20 year super-seniority plan. In the weeks fol-
lowing June 15, 21 more replacements accepted employment, plus 64
additional strikers.
20. The trial examiner dismissed the complaint, finding that the
Board's past decisions on superseniority had considered motivation as
the controlling factor and that in this case the evidence was inadequate to
support a finding that the corporation had adopted its superseniority plan
to discriminate against the union.
21. 132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961).
22. The Board cited section 2(3) of the Act and MacKay as author-
ity for its decision.
23. 303 F.2d 359 (1962).
24. The court cited several Supreme Court decisions-Teamsters, Lo-
cal 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
(1954) holding that motivation was the important factor in this type of
case.
to an employer's actions. Although the court did not mention
section 2(3) of the Act in its opinion, it did say that it found nothing
in the Act to change its decision. In reversing the circuit court,
the Supreme Court found that although it was important to show
the employer's intent or motive, specific evidence of such sub-
jective intent was not an indispensable element in proving the
violation.2r The Court said, "some conduct may by its very nature
contain the implication of the required intent from the natural
foreseeable consequences of that conduct. '26 The Court then held
that this super-seniority plan was that type of conduct and that
the burden of proving that this conduct was not discriminatory
fell on the employer. In this case the employer offered no proof
that its actions were not discriminatory; therefore, the super-
seniority plan was held to be an unfair labor practice. In distin-
guishing MacKay, the Court recognized that the "permanent re-
placement rule" which allowed an employer to operate his plant
during a strike by hiring permanent replacements could discourage
union membership. But the Court pointed out that the MacKay
decision was based upon a policy consideration that the employer's
interest in continuing his business outweighs the damage to con-
certed activities caused by permanently replacing strikers. Here,
however, the employer's interest in keeping his business running
efficiently by use of a super-seniority plan did not outweigh the
greater encroachment upon the right to strike resulting from super-
seniority plus permanent replacement.
In Erie Reisistor, then, the Supreme Court changed the burden
of proof on the issue of discriminatory actions from employee to
employer and refused to extend the MacKay rule. Although not
discussing preferential rights of economic strikers, the Court did
definitely explain what the MacKay rule entailed.
The Supreme Court further defined its position on the burden
of proof of discriminatory conduct in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc.2 7 The dispute between company and union was centered on a
collective bargaining agreement which contained a provision for
employee vacation benefits to be paid on the Friday nearest July 1
of each year. Most of the employees struck on May 16, 1963, and
many were permanently replaced. A demand for vacation pay by
the strikers on July 12, 1963, was rejected by the company. There-
after, the company announced that it would grant vacation pay
according to terms of the old agreement to all employees (includ-
ing strikers) who had reported for work on July 1, 1963. The union
brought suit claiming that this was an unfair labor practice. The
N.L.R.B. held that the employer was guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice because of its action in regard to vacation benefits, and ordered
25. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
26. Id. at 227 (1963).
27. 38B U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
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payment of such benefits to the strikers.28 In reversing the court
of appeals29 and affirming the N.L.R.B.'s decision, the Supreme
Court propounded several principles which would control cases in-
volving the issue of employer motivation and burden of proof.
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the em-
ployer's discriminatory conduct was 'inherently destruc-
tive' of important employee rights, no proof of an anti-
union motivation is needed and the Board can find an un-
fair labor practice even if the employer introduces evi-
dence that the conduct was motivated by business con-
siderations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discrimina-
tory conduct on employee rights is 'comparatively slight,'
an antiunion motivation must be proved by the employee
to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward
with evidence of legitimate and substantial business jus-
tification for the conduct. Thus, in either situation, once it
has been proved that the employer engaged in discrimi-
natory conduct which could have adversely affected em-
ployee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the em-
ployer to establish that he was motivated by the legitimate
objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to
him.30
The Court then applied these principles to the facts of the
case and found that the employer's conduct affected employees'
rights. Since the employer did not produce any evidence of legiti-
mate motives for its conduct, the employer's action was an un-
fair labor practice.31
The decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co. 32 was the next attack on the employer's citadel. Af-
ter an economic strike in August, 1964, during which the em-
28. 150 N.L.R.B. 438 (1965).
29. 363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966). The court said that although dis-
crimination between striking and non-striking employees was proved,
the Board's unfair labor practice conclusion was not well-founded because
there was no affirmative showing of an unlawful motivation to discour-
age membership. The court went even further by speculating upon sev-
eral motives, the possibility of which It felt was sufficient to overcome the
inference of improper motivation.
30. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
31. The Court did not decide if the employer's discriminatory conduct
was "inherently destructive" or if it was only "comparatively slight"
because it said it was not necessary to its decision since the employer
offered no evidence. But the fact that the Court reversed because the
employer did not produce any evidence of legitimate motives for its con-
duct makes it appear that the Court was considering the failure to rehire
strikers as conduct which was a "comparatively slight" invasion of em-
ployee rights. The opinion as a whole suggests that the court viewed
this conduct as "inherently destructive."
32. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
ployer cut back its production schedule, six strikers applied for
reinstatement on August 20 and a number of other occasions. The
employer rejected their applications because no jobs were available
at the time. But between October 8 and 16 the company hired
six new employees for jobs which the strikers were qualified to fill.
The union claimed that this action by the employer was an unfair
labor practice and brought suit. The trial examiner found that the
employer had committed an unfair labor practice by treating its
former employees as applicants for new employment without any
employee status. The N.L.R.B. simply adopted the decision of the
trial examiner without giving any further reasoning on the sub-
ject . 3  The trial examiner did not cite section 2(3) of the Act as
authority for his analysis of the striker's employee status, but it is a
fair assumption that this was his authority. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the ninth circuit3 4 citing section 2 (3) of the
Act. If the employer refuses to reinstate striking employees after
the conclusion of a strike, the effect is to discourage employees from
exercising their rights to organize and strike.35 Unless the em-
ployer can show that his actions were due to legitimate and sub-
stantial business requirements, the employer will be guity of an
unfair labor practice.3 6 At first, this seems to be the actual holding
of the case. But as Justices Harlan and Stewart point out in their
concurring opinion,3 7 in this case replacement or abolition of the
economic strikers' jobs did not occur. Therefore, the employer
erroneously treated the strikers as new applicants rather than as
employees under section 2(3) of the Act. Consequently, the major-
ity's decision involving the rights of all economic strikers must be
regarded as dictum and the holding of the case must be limited
to economic strikers who were not permanently replaced.
After Fleetwood, the employer still had the right to employ
33. 153 N.L.R.B. 425 (1966).
34. 366 F.2d 126, 131 (1966) (dissenting opinion). The court denied
the petition because of the Board's decision in Brown & Root, Inc., in
which the Board held that the question of whether or not a striker has been
replaced was to be determined on the date on which he made his offer to
return to work.
35. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
36. The Court does not indicate whether it considered the employer's
conduct as "inherently destructive" of striker's rights or "comparatively
slight." The fact that the Court gave the employer the opportunity to
prove business justification leads to the belief that the Court viewed de-
nial of preference in rehiring as a "comparatively slight" invasion of em-
ployee rights. But as in Great Dane, see note 30 supra, the opinion viewed
as a whole would suggest otherwise. The resolution of this issue is very
important because under Great Dane, if the employer's conduct is "inher-
ently destructive," the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the
employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business
considerations, but if the employer's conduct is "comparatively slight" the
employer can show business justifications and the Board cannot find an un-
fair labor practice unless the employer's motivation is specifically proved
by the employee.
37. 389 U.S. 375, 382 (1967).
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permanent replacements in strikers jobs during an economic strike.
But after the strike ended, the economic striker had a right to a job
if he thereafter applied, if on that day his job was not filled by a
permanent replacement or had not been abolished. Also, the em-
ployer now had the burden of proof or at least the burden of
going forward with the evidence to show that his actions were not
discriminatorily motivated. The only remnant of the employer's
citadel which remained was the employer's right to end the em-
ployee status of an economic striker on the day he applied for
reinstatement by finding his job either permanently filled or ab-
sorbed.
But this right was soon attacked in Laidlaw Corp. v. Pulp
Workers, Local 681. 31 Following unsuccessful negotiations in late
December, 1965 and early January, 1966, the union voted to reject
the employer's wage offer and notified the management of its in-
tention to strike. On the day before the strike, the plant manager
read a speech to the employees emphasizing that if they went out on
strike and were replaced, they would permanently lose their right
to employment by the corporation. Two days after the strike
commenced one of the strikers made an unconditional request for
reemployment. He was informed that his job was filled. He was
told that if he desired reemployment he would have to accept the
status of a new employee. Four days later the employer called
the striker and asked him to return to fill a vacancy. The striker
refused because of his loss of seniority and vacation rights. Thirty
days after the strike began the strikers voted to return to work.
Forty strikers went to the plant and made unconditional request
on behalf of all the strikers to return. After consulting with his
attorney, the plant manager read a prepared statement to the effect
that many of the strikers had been permanently replaced and
were not entitled to reinstatement. Those that were not perma-
nently replaced would be notified. At this time, all but five of the
economic strikers' jobs were filled by permanent replacements.
The five strikers who were not replaced were thereafter offered
jobs. A short time later, Laidlaw Corporation sent termination
notices to the replaced economic strikers. These notices said that
the strikers had been replaced as of the date of their written rein-
statement application and that no jobs were available. The cor-
poration, however, continued to advertise for permanent help and
a number of new employees were hired due to turnover. These
also included the departure of some permanent replacements. The
38. 171 N.L.R.B. 175 (1968).
union brought a charge of an unfair labor practice against the em-
ployer. The trial examiner89 held that the Laidlaw Corporation
committed an unfair labor practice by terminating the employ-
ment status of strikers and discharging them, contrary to section
2 (3) of the Act. The N.L.R.B.41 affirmed the decision and held that
economic strikers who unconditionally apply for reinstatement at a
time when their positions are filled by permanent replacements;
(1) remain employees; and
(2) are entitled to full reinstatement upon the departure
of replacements unless they have in the meantime ac-
quired regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment or if the employer can sustain his burden of proof
that the failure to offer full reinstatement was for le-
gitimate and substantial business reasons.
41
BOARD'S REASONING
In reaching their conclusion the Board cited the principles of
Fleetwood and Great Dane and then applied those principles to the
facts of Laidlaw. It must be noted that the Board, in relying on
Fleetwood, was actually relying on dictum. 42 As to the individual
striker who applied for reinstatement immediately, the Board
found that he was an economic striker. As such he retained his
status as an employee. If his position became vacant and he was
available he was entitled to full reinstatement unless there were
legitimate and substantial business justifications for a failure to
offer complete reinstatement. The strikers whose employment was
terminated by the corporation were held to be employees and were
entitled to full reinstatement as vacancies arose in their old
positions unless the employer could show legitimate and substantial
business justification for doing otherwise.
It is significant that the Board did not decide the Laidlaw case
on the anti-union motivation issue since the pre-strike statement by
the company and its hiring practices during and after the strike
would seem to indicate the possession of such motivation. In fact,
the Board said, "We find in accord with the trial examiner that
the company was in fact discriminatorily motivated in its actions.
'43
The Board could have easily decided this case on the ground of
anti-union motivation-an unfair labor practice. It appears that
the Board in deciding as it did wanted to give the Supreme Court a
clear statement as to the Board's position44 on the issue of prefer-
39. The trial examiner gave his decision before the Supreme Court's
decision in Fleetwood.
40. The N.L.R.B. decided the case after the Supreme Court's decision
in Fleetwood.
41. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 29, 828 (1968).
42. See p. 328 supra.
43. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 29, 825 (1968).
44. The Board's brief in Fleetwood was ambivalant as to the issue of
preferential hiring rights. The Board concluded that the position of the
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ential hiring rights of replaced economic strikers.
LEGITIMATE AND SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS JUSTIFICATION
In its decision in Laidlaw, the Board states that an employer
can refuse to reinstate economic strikers when there are openings
if the employer has "legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tions." The Board's decision does not give any examples or guide-
lines as to what they will consider necessary to fulfill these ex-
ceptions. In Fleetwood, the Supreme Court states that a legitimate
and substantial business justification is when the jobs which the
strikers claim are occupied by workers hired as permanent re-
placements during the strike in order to continue operations. This
is the rule of MacKay. A basis suggested by the Board 45 is
when the striker's job has been eliminated for substantial and bona
fide reasons other than considerations relating to labor relations,
for example, the need to adapt to change in business conditions or
to improve efficiency. 46 These arguments would seem to be those
used by employers to establish skill or ability criteria in contract
negotiations.
47
INHERENTLY DESTRUCTIVE OR COMPARATIVELY SLIGHT
The vagueness and the need for clarification of these terms can
best be illustrated by the Board's decision in Laidlaw. The Board
found specifically that the Laidlaw Corporation "had not shown any
legitimate and substantial business justification for not offering full
reinstatement to these strikers and, that, accordingly, the failure to
make such an offer constitutes an unfair labor practice ... .
This statement clearly shows that the Board regarded the employer's
conduct as "comparatively slight" in affecting employees rights un-
der Great Dane because the Board relies on the fact that the em-
ployer had brought forward no evidence. But later in its opinion 49
the Board states that Laidlaw Corporation's offer to the individual
striker of less than full reinstatement and the termination notices
sent the other strikers, were wholly unrelated to any of its eco-
complaints had not been abolished. Brief for N.L.R.B. at 14, NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailers Inc., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
45. Brief for N.L.R.B. at 15, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailers Inc., 389
U.S. 375 (1967).
46. 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967).
47. NLRB v. MacKay Radio and Telephone Co., 304 U.S. 333 at 347
(1938).
48. Laidlaw Corp. v. Pulp Workers, Local 681, 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. at
29, 824 (1968).
49. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. at 29, 826 (1968).
nomic needs. Its effect was to penalize economic strikers for en-
gaging in concerted activity. Thus it was "inherently destructive"
of employee rights. Under this categorization of the employer's
conduct, it would not matter what kind of evidence the employer
produced to establish business justification; the Board could still
find that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice. 50
Although the actual holding of Laidlaw puts the employer's con-
duct in the "comparatively slight" category, the decision as a whole
points out the need for the Board to clarify these two important
terms.
RETROACTIVITY
The Board cites Erie Resistor as authority 51 for its holding
which retroactively applies the standard of section 2(3) of the Act
to replaced economic strikers, but analysis of Erie Resistor does not
support the Board's conclusion. In Erie Resistor the employer
awarded additional seniority credit for 20 years to replacements for
strikers and also to strikers who returned to work during the strike.
Nothing was offered to strikers who did not return during the
strike. This was a clear case of discrimination and punishment
against the economic striker. But in Laidlaw, the corporation, by
considering the economic strikers' application for reemployment
only on the date they applied for reemployment, was only following
the decisions of the N.L.R.B. until that time. Thus, the Board
retroactively applied a newly-amended rule. This type of ruling
has been extensively criticized52 and runs against an established
trend in the law. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil
and Refining5" the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state
court decision which changed the judicial construction of a state
statute, but refused to apply the new construction where plaintiff
relied on the old judicial construction of the statute. Since then
the Supreme Court appears to have done substantially the same
thing with respect to the imposition of criminal liability.54
SECTION 2 (3) OF THE ACT
In its opinion the Board states that the holding of Laidlaw was
foreshadowed by and is consistent with the Supreme Court's de-
50. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (dis-
senting opinion).
51. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. at 29, 826 (1968).
52. Berger, Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L .REv.
371 (1967); Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962); Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and
Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960).
53. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
54. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). See NLRB v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952); Recent Case Notes, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 348 (1952), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 140 (1952).
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cision in NLRB v MacKay Radio and Telegraph Co."" What the
Board is referring to is the Supreme Court's reference in MacKay
to section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court
said, "The term 'employee' shall include ... any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any
current labor dispute and who has not obtained any other regular
and substantially equivalent employment. .... 6
Thus, the Board points out by the above reference that in
MacKay the Supreme Court used section 2 (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act to determine the economic strikers' status. This
standard will now control the rights of replaced economic strikers.
This is indeed ironic. In the three cases overruled by Laidlaw, the
N.L.R.B. and the various federal courts involved decided the issue
of the replaced economic striker's status without reference to this
section of the Act.
The basic right raised in the issue of preferential hiring rights
of replaced economic strikers is the right of an employee to strike.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the term employee in
addition to its normal meaning-a person who works for another
for hire-includes any worker whose employment has ceased be-
cause of a labor dispute or unfair labor practice.5T Under section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act an employee is guaranteed
the right to form or join unions, to bargain collectively, and to
strike.5 Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act5" make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to violate
an employee's section 7 rights or to discriminate against an employee
because of union membership. Thus, when the courts are deter-
mining what rights replaced economic strikers have, they are in-
terpreting how broad or narrow the right to strike will be.
The legislative history of the Act does give some insight into
the purpose of section 2(3). In the 1935 legislative history,60 Har-
vey G. Ellard, representing the Institute of American Meat Pack-
ers, pointed out at a Senate hearing that section 2(3) of the Act
was something new in legislation. To that time the law had been
that when a person leaves the employment of another his employ-
ment terminates. Mr. Ellard further pointed out that section 2(3)
of the Act permits many implications because it allows a striker
55. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 29, 826 (1968).
56. 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
57. Section 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
58. Section 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
59. Section 8(a) (1) and (3), 49 Stat. 453 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1)
and (3).
60. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Legislature History of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act 1883 (1935).
to retain the status of an employee while not actually working for
his employer. Although there is little else in the legislative history
to help determine the purpose of section 2 (3), Mr. Ellard's remarks
do lend credence to a "plain meaning" interpretation of section 2 (3).
Congress intended the statute to give an economic striker the status
of an employee until he obtains regular and substantially equiva-
lent employment. In section 7 of the Act, Congress gave the em-
ployee the right to strike. Therefore, it had to provide a means
by which the striker could regain his job after the strike. The
means that Congress used was section 2(3). It is also clear that
Congress intended the economic striker's status as an employee to
continue until he obtained regular and substantially equivalent
employment; nothing in MacKay affected this status.
American Flint Glass Workers, Atlas Storage Division, and
Brown and Root, Inc., all purported to end the economic striker's
status as an employee when he applied for reinstatement and found
a permanent replacement had either filled his job or that it had
been abolished. But as already pointed out, these decisions did not
apply section 2(3) of the Act and misinterpreted MacKay. They
therefore must be disregarded.
In deciding Laidlaw the Board had section 2(3) of the Act and
MacKay as well as the dictum of Fleetwood as authority on the
issue of the hiring rights of replaced economic strikers. But as the
brief for the Fleetwood Corporation pointed out, the Board also
had to consider section 9(c) (3)01 of the Act which was inserted in
1947 and amended in 1959, and the 1947 legislative history to guide
the Board in its decision. Section 9(c) (3) uses the term "economic
strikers not entitled to reinstatement." This could be interpreted
as affirming the Board's decisions which held that an economic
striker's status as an employee ends when he reapplies and finds a
permanent replacement filling his job. Also, twice in the 1947 legis-
lative history of the Labor Management Act it was stated that
"strikers permanently replaced have no right to reinstatement. '6 2
The problem of consent by Congress to the Board's decisions was
not discussed in Laidlaw. But if Congress did intend by the passage
of section 9(c) (3) to affirm the Board's past decisions on the issue
of preferential hiring rights of economic strikers, the holding of
these cases would have become the law.0 3
However, in the legislative history of the Labor Management
61. Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not en-
titled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regu-lations as the Board shall find are consistent with the provisions
and purpose of this Act in any election conducted within 12 months
after the commencement of the strike.
73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2) (1964).
62. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Legislative History of the La-
bor management Act 1101 (1947).
63. Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U.S. 254 (1955).
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Relations Act of 1947 there is evidence that Congress did not intend
section 9(c) (3) as an affirmance of the Board's decisions.6 4 The
Senate was discussing a proposed amendment to section 2 (3) of the
Act which inserted a simple parenthetical expression into the sec-
tion stating that, "a worker loses his employee status if, while
engaging in a strike, he has been replaced or has refused an offer
of reinstatement." Senator Morse in speaking against the amend-
ment said, "this change in definition of the term employee not
only removes all remedies available to strikers under the Act; for
all practical purposes, it completely destroys the right to strike ...
Even at common law, employees who were out on strike were still
employees. This concept was incorporated in the Wagner Act."65
This amendment was rejected by Congress. Therefore it can
be said with some certainty that Congress did not intend by sec-
tion 9(c) (3) that economic strikers should lose their status as em-
ployees when they reapplied and found they had been permanently
replaced.
The policy considerations which probably entered into the
Board's decision on the rights of replaced economic strikers can best
be illustrated by an analysis of the facts of Laidlaw. There the
employer tried to use the "permanent replacement rule" plus the
Board's past decisions to coerce its employees not to strike. Thus
the employer tried to use the Board's rulings to nullify the em-
ployees' congressionally guaranteed right to strike. Also, the quick
hiring of permanent replacements by the employer could be inter-
preted as motivated by an intent to penalize the strikers and make
sure they would not reap any of the benefits the strike would
gain. This quick replacement could also serve as a warning for the
next contract disputes, in that, it would prove to the employees
that if they went on strike, they would not gain from the strike
even if it were successful. These dangers inherent in the Board's
pre-Laidlaw decisions necessitated a change to a more balanced
rule.
CONCLUSION
Although the decision of the N.L.R.B. in Laidlaw needs clarifica-
tion, it is submitted that the Board correctly applied section 2 (3),
of the National Labor Relations Act as well as the principles of
Great Dane to the facts of the case. It has implemented a rule
which coincides with the intent of Congress in passing the Na-
64. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Legislative History of the La-
bor Management Act 956 (1947).
65. Id.
tional Labor Relations Act. The decision also balances the needs
of employer and employee in that it retains the employer's right to
hire permanent replacements during a strike. At the same time
it gives the replaced economic strikers a preferential right to his job
if a vacancy occurs before he can get substantially equivalent em-
ployment. This imposes no extra burden on the employer. If a
vacancy occurs the employer will get the same employee whom he
was satisfied with before the strike. But the decision does prevent
the erosion of the employees' right to strike by the employer.
"Legitimate and substantial business justification" is the excep-
tion to the rule of preferential hiring rights and as such must be
clarified in order that the employer may know when he does not
have to give the replaced economic striker a preferential right to
a job.
Placing the employer's conduct into the categories of "inher-
ently destructive" or "comparatively slight" by failing to give re-
placed economic strikers preferential hiring rights, presents prob-
lems to the courts.6 The best rule seems to be to place this con-
duct in the "comparatively slight" category and thus give the em-
ployer a chance to show legitimate and substantial business justifi-
cation for his conduct. Although there is some confusion in
LaidlawT the actual holding there does apply this rule.
Further, it is disturbing that the decision in Laidlaw is retro-
active. As such, it penalizes the Laidlaw Corporation for merely
following previous decisions of the N.L.R.B. The Board should
exercise the power granted to it by Congress to formulate rules
in these situations, rather than proceed as it does by adjudication. 8
EDWARD A. FEDOK
66. Notes 30 and 35 supra.
67. See p. 331 supra.
68. Although the Board has the power to make rules (§ 6, 49 Stat.
452 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1964)) it has not chosen to exercise it. Boire v.
Miami Herald Pub. Co., 343 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1965).
